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TRANSATLANTIC TENSION AND THREAT PERCEPTION
Mary Elise Sarotte

E

uropeans, now dealing with a second Bush tour of duty, are understandably
wondering whether it will reverse the deterioration in transatlantic relations
begun during the first. That the state of relations declined during the first term is
not in doubt. Despite the initial outpouring of sympathy for the United States in
late 2001 and early 2002, in 2003 a poll by the German Marshall Fund (GMF)
found that an astonishing 81 percent of German and 82 percent of French respondents had come to disapprove of the way that President Bush was handling
1
international policy. In February and March 2004, the Pew Research Center repeated similar poll questions not only in Europe but also worldwide. When
asked if they thought that American and British leaders had honestly believed
that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or had simply lied, 82 percent of French respondents said the leaders had been
Dr. Mary Sarotte, a U.S. citizen, is a tenured faculty
member in the Department of Politics at the University
lying. The French percentage was higher even than that
of Cambridge and a Fellow of St. John’s College. Dr.
of Morocco (48 percent), Pakistan (61 percent), Turkey,
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2
and Jordan (both 69 percent). These statistics are
and earned a PhD in history at Yale. She has written for
3
The Economist, Time, Die Zeit, worked for the Interonly a tiny sample; there are many more to this effect.
national Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and
The reasons underlying this unfortunate decline are
served as a White House Fellow. She appears as a political commentator on CNN International and Sky. Her
numerous and have rightly received extensive attention.
publications include Dealing with the Devil (2001)
This essay will not repeat well-known arguments—most
and German Military Reform and European Security
famously, Robert Kagan’s view that Americans are
(2001), as well as popular and scholarly articles.
from Mars and Europeans from Venus—but rather offer
Portions of this article have been published in German
in the journal Internationale Politik; they appear coura new hypothesis. It will suggest how political history—
tesy of the editor.
and particularly the legacy of eighteenth-century politics—can help us to understand the current rift.
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THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
What governments perceive as a threat is determined by what they understand
their areas of responsibility, and their priorities, to be. So, to understand threat
perception, it is necessary to step back and look at the evolution of federal authority. In other words, it is necessary to ask a very basic question: What are the
responsibilities of the central authority? Even a brief historical examination,
such as that provided below, shows that Americans and Europeans have very different notions of federal authority, and that this, in turn, shapes their very differing threat perceptions. An understanding of this discrepancy will help prevent
both sides from talking past each other during the second Bush administration.
METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
A few clarifications are necessary before getting under way. First, this article will
employ the methodology of political history. It will focus on American and
European perceptions of how a national authority can best respond to global
threats and on the impact of the disparity between their views. It will not attempt, in the limited space available, to show that Americans are right and Europeans are wrong, or vice versa. Rather, the goal of this article is to highlight the
discrepancies, which have themselves received insufficient attention. Secondly,
threat perception for present purposes means the public understanding of
4
threat, as displayed in polling data, speeches, and public proclamations.
Finally, it is important to define “U.S. power” as used here. The focus will be
on American military power, because the transatlantic rift is, in large part, a
debate about how that should be used in the world (if at all). As a result, before
debating how to use U.S. might, it is helpful to make at least a brief attempt to
quantify just how much of it there is. Depending on which figures are included,
U.S. defense spending tops that of the next twelve to fifteen nations combined
5
and represents between 40 and 50 percent of all world spending on defense. The
United States maintains 752 military installations in 130 countries, with signifi6
cant numbers of troops in sixty-five of these. As Princeton’s Professor John
Ikenberry puts it, “U.S. military bases and carrier groups ring the world. Russia
is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has
accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first
time in the modern era, the world’s most powerful state can operate on the
7
global stage without the constraints of other great powers.”
Of course, there are many different kinds and levels of power exertion, as anyone with even a passing familiarity with Joseph Nye’s multilevel chessboard
knows. In their book America’s Inadvertent Empire, retired general William
Odom and coauthor Robert Dujarric inventively measure American power not
only by its defense budget but also by the youth of its population and even by the
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number of articles published in a year by the Harvard economics faculty (more
8
than that of any continental European country). Yale professor Paul Kennedy
also looks to less obvious indicators. He cites the fact that scholars working in
the United States have won 75 percent of Nobel Prizes in science, medicine, and
9
economics as evidence of American dominance. Indeed, in May 2004, Science
ranked universities around the world on the basis of easily tabulated indicators,
such as numbers of articles cited and prizes won. Of the top fifty universities
10
worldwide, thirty-five were American.
None of this makes the United States invulnerable, of course. Its indebtedness
and current-account deficit render it financially vulnerable. As the world’s
strongest military power, it is also the world’s most tempting target. It also has to
contend with the classic security dilemma—it must perpetually worry about
whether its predominance might provoke a balancing reaction and, if so, when
and in what form. Nonetheless, there is a quantitative strength that informs Bush
administration thinking about its obligations (or lack thereof) to the world.
USING POLITICAL HISTORY TO HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENT
UNDERSTANDINGS OF “FEDERALISM”
How can political history help us understand the current transatlantic rift? It
illuminates the fundamental transatlantic divide as to what kind of security
the central government should provide. Americans and Europeans have very
different views of the role of the federal government in providing for their national security. It is even hard to know what language to use to describe this
gap; the American notion of “federal authority” barely translates into the European context. In continental Europe, “federal” is a word associated largely with
the European Union (EU) and connotes dispersal of authority. In the United
States, the “federal government” (or even the “feds”) is a shorthand reference
to the national government and centralized power—a twist effected centuries
ago by James Madison to co-opt opponents of a strong central government, as
will be discussed below. So, American citizens can talk of federal power, but the
phrase is often lost in translation, since its meaning is different in the European context.
When this discrepancy in the understanding of “federalism” overlaps with
transatlantic debates about how best to ensure security, it becomes apparent that
a curious collision of historical legacies is happening. The three main legacies
are a narrow U.S. interpretation of the role of the federal government, which
originated in the eighteenth-century debate over how much central authority
was permissible; the Cold War expansion of federal power in light of the need for
an extensive American national security apparatus; and a very different European notion of the responsibilities of a central authority.
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A Narrow U.S. View of the Federal Government’s Security Role
To understand the present American view of the federal government’s security
role, it helps to investigate its origins in one of the most revered collections of
documents in the nation’s political history, the Federalist Papers. Authored by
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, these eighty-five essays were
published in the New York Independent Journal newspaper in 1787 and 1788.
They represented an eloquent effort to sway doubting members of the public in
favor of ratifying the draft U.S. Constitution and of creating a strong national
government. Given how revered the Constitution is today, it is important to remember how controversial it was originally. Citizens of the United States at the
time had the evils of overly powerful central authority fresh in their memories.
They had recently fought a war to rid themselves of the rule of the British monarch. However, the weak central authority erected after the war under the Articles of Confederation had proved unequal to the task of governing the fragile
new country. The draft produced at the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787 was a daring attempt to redefine national government. The authors
of these papers were hoping to steal their opponents’ thunder by calling themselves
11
“federalists” and the strong central government they proposed a federal one.
Jay, future chief justice of the Supreme Court, argued in Federalist 3 that
“among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.” He
pessimistically continued in Federalist 4, “It is too true, however disgraceful it
may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they
have a prospect of getting anything by it.” As a result, a crucial justification for
creating a strong national authority was defense. “Leave America divided into
thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one
was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and
money in its defense?”
In other words, the very first justification for political union offered by three
of America’s greatest political minds was what U.S. leaders would today call
homeland security. This view, rather than fading in the following centuries of
American growth and expansion, has remained a significant strain of contemporary conservative political thought. It holds that protecting U.S. territorial integrity is not just the first but the only truly vital mission of the U.S. federal
12
government. It is a view prevalent in much of America to this day, and not just
in the post-9/11 “red states.” In 1996 and again in 2000, RAND, the Kennedy
School, and the Nixon Center jointly organized a Commission on U.S. National
Interests. The commission could find only four: territorial integrity, security of
all of North America, prevention of domination of Europe and Northeast Asia
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by a hostile power, and maintenance of key international trading and financial
13
networks. Of these, the first was the only truly vital one.
In contrast, today’s Europeans—even the British—expect much more from
their national leaders than territorial defense: free (or low-cost) health care and
university-level education, national news broadcasting, and public transportation, to name just a few. In other words, the narrow view of federal authority exemplified by the right wing of the Republican Party is badly at odds with the
view even of those Europeans right of center, to say nothing of the left.
The Cold War Legacy
This narrow American understanding of federal authority, strategic weakness in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the strains of continental expansion and civil war meant that the resulting U.S. foreign policy was an inwardlooking one. Indeed, at first glance it might seem that the only logical foreign
policy that could arise from such a narrow view would be isolationism. Conflict
with Mexico notwithstanding, it took the events of the twentieth century to
prove otherwise—that such a narrow understanding of federal responsibility
can, and does, translate into interventionism. In other words, there has always
been agreement across the U.S. political spectrum on the need to defend the
homeland. The eternal question is how. As memorably phrased by political scientist Michael Roskin, the conundrum is whether that defense starts “on the
14
near or far side of the ocean.”
Woodrow Wilson was the first president to make a sustained effort to defend
U.S. security on the far side of the ocean. Whether he did so out of idealism (as
say his supporters) or imperialism (as say his detractors), the relevant point for
our purposes is that he was clearly unafraid of action overseas. As the British political scientist Michael Cox and others have argued, “he was never squeamish
when it came to using American force abroad: he did so in fact on no fewer than
15
seven occasions between 1914 and 1918.” After the end of World War I, however, he lost the political backing needed to continue engagement abroad in
16
peacetime. He could take the United States into World War I, but he could not
establish interventionism as a legacy, or so it seemed. The matter appeared
firmly settled in favor of isolationism.
The catastrophe of the Weimar era not only reopened the matter sooner than
anyone expected but decisively created a new legacy of American engagement
abroad. In his Surprise, Security and the American Experience, Yale historian John
Lewis Gaddis praises President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for realizing this
sooner and more clearly than anyone else. He argues that FDR’s true genius lay
in his ability to embed “conflicting unilateral priorities within a cooperative
multilateral framework.” In other words, Roosevelt realized that the “pursuit of
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national interests . . . need not preclude the emergence of collective interests, be17
cause nobody had an interest in fighting another great war.” His cooperative
approach—that is, starting U.S. defense on the far side of the ocean in cooperation with the people who lived there—proved to be one of the most successful
grand strategies of all time.
This switch to defending the United States “on the far side of the ocean,”
which defined the Cold War, had far-reaching consequences not only for foreign
policy but also for U.S. domestic politics. The creation of a permanent massive
national security apparatus greatly increased the power of the federal government in Washington, D.C. As Ikenberry and his coauthor Daniel Deudney argue, it also served to strengthen American national identity by overcoming
“ethnic and sectional differences and the ideological heritage of individualism.”18 Writing in 1994, they predicted that the sudden end of the Cold War
would cause these accomplishments to unravel. In other words, the pendulum
would swing back to calling for defense on the near side of the ocean, with a corre19
sponding decrease in interest in international issues. Various statistics from the
1990s support their observation. American spending on coverage of foreign
20
news declined. Foreign language courses emptied of students. Even PhD candiates in political science did not have to learn the language or culture of the
21
countries in which they were supposedly becoming expert.
Crucially, 11 September 2001 stopped the pendulum. This in turn created a
paradox. In responding to the terrorist attacks of that day, the Bush administration launched upon a mission that is, although not in detail, fundamentally Cold
War in spirit. Namely, it is starting the defense of the homeland on the far
(sometimes very far) side of the ocean. As a result, two legacies have collided. The
administration is using U.S. might to undertake a mission consistent with the
Cold War, or interventionist, legacy, even as it subscribes to the earlier legacy of
limited federal responsibility. Its narrow view of the role of the central government is, for example, the rationale that inspires the Bush administration’s fervent
tax-cutting philosophy. The inherent conflict between the two legacies is crucial.
The world is no longer in the post–Cold War, or even post-post–Cold War,
period but rather what might properly be called the Washington Era, for it is
Washington’s convictions and contradictions that define it. This contradiction
is central to the administration’s foreign policy, so it is worth detailing the policy
consequences. The poor fit between these two legacies manifests itself in profound policy-making ambivalence. The chief result is the paradoxical (and
counterproductive) combination of wars of prevention overseas with a decrease
in both taxation and federal programs at home. It produces, first, equally fervent
desires to send troops abroad and to bring them home, both quickly; second,
willingness to call for cooperative security but to defeat or to abandon
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agreements in the Senate or on the campaign trail; and third, insistence that oth22
ers comply with international accords even as the United States exempts itself.
Of course, there are deeper contradictions as well. As historian Mel Leffler rightly
points out, “If one’s credibility is vested in the achievement of too many goals,
23
one’s relative power will erode and one’s core values may become imperiled.”
Moreover, on a practical level, the administration is fighting a new kind of
asymmetric war against transnational, nonstate actors while burdened with not
just Cold War concepts but the very same national security institutions. If the
mission is Cold War in spirit, many U.S. national security institutions are also
Cold War in practice. As the 9/11 Commission’s concluding report of July 2004
maintained, the federal government still has much outdated national security
24
bureaucracy and needs updating as soon as possible. It remains to be seen
whether the intelligence reform bill passed in December 2004 will institute significant changes in the security practices.
American versus European Threat Perceptions
What does this clash of legacies imply for threat perception? To the president
and chief executive officer of RAND, James Thomson, it is apparent that the
breakdown in American-European relations has its fundamental roots “in the
different strategic appraisals of . . . Germany, France and several smaller Euro25
pean countries.” Just as Europeans have different expectations from their national governments, they also have different assessments of what constitutes a
threat to their well-being—in other words, requires a response. What does this
mean in practice?
Post-9/11, the United States senses a new vulnerability and a new kind of existential threat. Its defense budget has risen, topping four hundred billion dollars
in fiscal year 2005. September 11 has even enabled the Bush administration to
explore ways to reexamine the utility of nuclear weapons, in particular so-called
mini-nukes. As deterrence scholar Patrick Morgan puts it, “Inside its military establishment, in Congress, industry and the public there are clusters devoted to
finding better living through nuclear weapons. . . . All are hoping to make nu26
clear weapons steadily more usable.”
In contrast, for many European political leaders, particularly the United
Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Germany, terrorism is an old problem. European
states, and the EU as a whole, did indeed tighten their domestic security measures in response to both the 2001 and the Madrid attacks. But a high-profile
Council on Foreign Relations task force headed by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence
Summers pointed out in 2004 that many NATO allies had begun “questioning
the administration’s insistence that the security of all nations was now at
27
risk.” As Robert Kagan put it, in a 2004 updating of his famous 2002 article,
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Most Europeans never fully shared Washington’s concerns about weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—not during the Clinton administration, and not since. . . . Rightly or wrongly, Europeans do not believe that those
weapons will be aimed at them. To the extent that they do worry, moreover, most
Europeans do not look to the United States to protect them anymore. . . . Instead,
28
they ask, Who will guard the guards?

Even as American politicians sound the alarm, Europeans sound skeptical.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security “orange alerts” provoke shrugs on the
continent. To cite just one example, when Tom Ridge made American headlines
on 6 August 2004 with his elevated-threat warning to financial districts in the
New York and Washington, D.C., areas, EU officials yawned. The union’s
counterterrorism director, Gijs de Vries, remained on vacation. The director of
Germany’s Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy, Rolf Tophoven,
questioned the timing and echoed former U.S. presidential candidate Howard
Dean in his assessment of the August alert: “You shouldn’t forget that there is an
election campaign and that in times of crisis people tend to rally around the in29
cumbent government. This is not a bad thing for Bush.” As Richard Betts has
pointed out, the failings of the American intelligence community in the run-up
to the Iraq war, and subsequent investigations into what went wrong, have cre30
ated enormous skepticism about U.S. worries.
European political leaders are, of course, worried by Islamic extremism. But
their threat assessment encompasses a greater variety of concerns. Although almost never voiced publicly by elected European officials, there is concern about
Russia. It is rarely announced as policy, but the force structure of the
Bundeswehr—still, all these years after the end of the Cold War, organized to defend the homeland against tanks coming from the east—makes it obvious. In a
way that frustrates and confounds its NATO partners, Germany still de facto
prioritizes conventional territorial defense even as it pledges allegiance to the
31
Petersberg tasks,* which presume force projection capabilities.
The Russians returned the favor. In a speech in London on 13 July 2004, Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov spoke bluntly of his country’s feelings about
NATO expansion to the Baltics:
You are all aware of our calmly negative attitude towards expansion of the North Atlantic alliance. . . . What alarms us the most, from the point of view of our own security is the NATO deployment of means and forces on the territory of its new
members. . . . Our anxiety over the state of arms control in Europe is based on the
fact that the “gray zone” in this sphere has evolved in Europe for the first time in the
*Steps designed to improve the operational capability of the Western European Union (WEU), as
contained in the Petersberg Declaration, issued by a WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn,
19 June 1992.
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last fifteen years. We wouldn’t like Europe to return to the principles of balance of
power, but there may be no vacuum in the military-political situation. Especially if
this vacuum is filled with irresponsible statements of nationalistic character. Frankly
speaking, the existence of European states that do not observe standard norms of democracy and human rights is interpreted by Russia as a threat.32

With a few changes of names and dates, much of this language would still represent serviceable Cold War boilerplate. However alarming it might sound to
Europeans, however, it rated barely a mention in the United States. The Bush administration, despite the Yukos Oil Company drama at the end of 2004* and an
internal review begun early in 2005, largely considers Russia to be a solved problem—and it is undertaking significant force restructuring in Europe. On 16
August 2004, President Bush announced to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars that the Pentagon would withdraw sixty to seventy thousand troops
from Europe and Asia—mainly two heavy divisions now based in Germany—
33
over the course of the next ten years. The second-term administration may be
caught very short indeed if de-democratization in Russia accelerates.
There is also an argument, not uncommon in Washington, that the issue that
most concerns European elected officials is not territorial but job security, or to
be more precise, the security of jobs in the European defense industry. European
†
security specialist Mette Sangiovanni has argued forcefully that ESDP is pointless, because lack of European political unity (not to mention the expected need
for a United Nations mandate) would emasculate it in the face of any crisis. But
the one value that even she finds in ESDP is that its success would “restructure
the European defense industry in order to develop a stronger and more efficient
high-tech industrial sector.” It would “offer opportunities to rationalise defence
spending and reduce procurement costs through cooperation on armaments pro34
duction and undo the dramatically increased reliance on U.S. defense products.”
FOR WHAT THREATS TO DOMESTIC SECURITY IS FEDERAL
AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE?
It is an exaggeration, but one useful for highlighting the discrepancy at hand, to
say the main uncontested role of the U.S. national government is to provide territorial security, while the main uncontested role of most European national
governments is to provide economic security. Obviously the two are interrelated,
*That is, the jailing of its founder, then the seizure and forced sale to the government of its largest
unit.
†European Security and Defense Policy, an EU initiative arising from the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty: “The
central aim is to complete and thus strengthen the European Union’s external ability to act through the
development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management.” (“External Relations,” Europa, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/.)
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but they remain distinct. The job of territorial security in Europe has de facto
been “outsourced” to—depending on the circumstances—nascent EU security
institutions, NATO, or coalitions of the willing. Even British military planning is
now based on the assumption that any military conflict involving the United
Kingdom would also involve the United States, and its leaders shape procure35
ment accordingly.
To repeat the argument stated in brief at the outset, what a government perceives as a threat is determined by what it understands its areas of responsibility—
and its priorities—to be. For the U.S. federal government, maintaining territorial integrity is a much higher priority than, say, enabling its citizens to obtain a
university-level education. It would be absurd to say that European national
governments do not care about territorial integrity; obviously, they do. But
other priorities accompany it near the top of their lists of concerns. Their understanding of what constitutes “homeland security”—a phrase not commonly
used in Europe, as opposed to the United States—is much broader than the
American view, as it includes a commitment to social welfare programs unmatched in the United States. European leaders, and particularly Germans, place
a much higher priority on such challenges as European integration and management of their social market economies. Moreover, European voters and national
governments alike worry, in a way that the United States does not understand,
about the threat posed by America itself. The worry is not a straightforward notion that somehow the United States will become an enemy of Europe again.
Rather, there exists concern both that American behavior will damage the efficacy
of a rule-based international order and that its actions will create an enormous
anti-Western backlash that could engulf Europe as well as the United States.
In short, because of profoundly varying understandings about both the nature and responsibilities of federal authority, Washington and European leaders
are talking past each other. The answer to the question, “What threats to domestic security is federal authority responsible for?” is a very different one on opposite sides of the Atlantic. To answer this question, Europeans would first need to
clarify what is meant by “federal” authority. Then they would produce a long list
of duties. Hence, the individual national capitals have fewer resources to devote
to each of the tasks, and the European Union security apparatus is still too new
to compensate with economies of scale in the provision of security.
The American response would be a different and—as the historical analysis
here has shown—internally contradictory one. The Bush administration, contrary to the sweeping proclamations made in the second inaugural speech on 20
January 2005, ultimately adheres to a narrow version of federal authority. For this
reason the White House spent much of the day after the inaugural speech
36
downplaying its significance, a curious follow-up to a major presidential address.
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In summary, the U.S. position represents the awkward combination of two
different historical legacies. The contradictions inherent in these legacies help to
explain some of the paradoxes of first-term Bush administration foreign policy,
and the same clash of legacies will continue to inform policy making in the second term. When the Bush team said “four more years” during the campaign, it
meant just that. The second Bush administration is peopled largely by individuals who do not feel that they need to change their approach drastically. Hence
contradictions from the first term will persist. The more that its European partners understand about this inherent contradiction, and the more that Americans understand about the very different European understanding of
“homeland security,” the better they will be able to deal with each other in the
coming years.
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